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1. Introduction ♣ 
The transition process and the European enlargement have been providing footloose 
MNEs with new space to re-organise their production and to re-locate the plants. Few studies 
approach the complex theme of industrial location in the EU new-comers: statistics are still 
scarce, language constitutes a barrier for assuming reliable information, and the differences in 
the economic and institutional structure bring further difficulties. On the contrary, research on 
FDI since their remarkable surge on early '80s has been gaining increasing space in the 
literature.1  
This paper aims at investigating the relation between FDI and institutional change in 
three selected countries of the CEECs, namely: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland 
with a quantitative focus on the socio-political characteristics of these countries. Further to the  
privatisation  process, which has played a major role in determining the direction of  FDIs,  
the socio and economic characteristics of a country are likely to affect the behaviour of the 
firms thus making their presence less volatile. Therefore, the main thesis of this paper is that 
the reform process2 mitigates the risk of investment and encourages investors to undertake 
long run position in an economy. A suitable environment  encompasses other factors over and  
beyond macroeconomic stability and the non-discriminatory treatment of FDI, which have 
already been highly accomplished in many CEECs countries. Substantial absence of 
bureaucratic interference, the presence of fair and certain rules, and the existence of the 
market and supportive financial institutions3 are additional factors that come into 
consideration in the location decision of a firm. Moreover, in transition countries the existence 
of a sound political climate and the possibility of connections with ruling elites, which 
increase the opportunities for special concessions in the privatisation process, are as important 
factors as technical and managerial know-how, geographical location, and proximity to 
transport hubs are elsewhere.  
                                                 
♣ A preliminary and incomplete version of this paper was presented at the IV Annual Conference of the 
European Economics and Finance Society in Coimbra, May 2005. The authors thank the participants in the 
session "…….." for precious comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply. The present version was 
accepted at the V Annual Conference of the EUNIP in Limerick, 2006.  
1  See Soci [2006] forthcoming 
2 The reform process we intend in this paper is both the economic and political one. In particular, as far as the 
economic reforms are concerned we focus on the process of privatisation (as long as stabilisation and 
liberalisation were mostly achieved in the first years of reforms) and of establishing the rule of law. Political 
reforms include the process of democratic stabilisation, and, in this case, of EU accession.  
3  As an example of the relevance of these aspects for economics, see Giavazzi and Tabellini [2004] 
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The relative homogeneity of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in terms of  their 
institutional harmonisation process may help in better disentangling the role that socio 
economic characteristics play in affecting the behaviour of firms,  and this justifies the paper’s 
exclusive focus on these three countries.. Nonetheless some differences hold in what concerns 
each country’s specific approach to the privatisation process.4  
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows: section 1 surveys very briefly the 
empirical literature; section 2 presents the data and provides the theoretical framework that we 
use for our analysis; section 3, finally, offers some concluding remarks. 
 
SECTION I: empirical literature on the CEECs 
Until the end of the 1990s relatively few studies took a quantitative approach to the 
complex relationship between FDI and the economies of the EU newcomers. Most surveys 
and econometric studies belonging to this first wave are concisely reviewed by Holland et al., 
(2000), which allows us here to concentrate on the more recent ones.  
The study of transition-economies requires a set of variables which are representative of  
the overall social and political situation of a country in addition to  the variables commonly 
used in the "new-trade-new-geography" theory such as market size (and/or potential demand) 
and the geographical distance,  combined with (mainly labour) cost differentials.5 In the case 
of transition-countries the relative backwardness in the business operating conditions, 
including the ongoing process of liberalisation and privatisation, and some political risks 
concerning the quality of the institutional environment and the legal framework also deserve 
attention. Bevan et al. (2004) are very accurate in the description of the effects of the 
institutional environment and in providing the testable hypotheses. Their contribution is by 
and large also the most complete insofar as these aspects are concerned. A review of the most 
recent literature on FDI provides a tentative list of  the variables most commonly used in the 
                                                 
4 Since 1998 the EBRD considered these three economies as having  nearly converged to the standards of 
industrialised economies according to 9 transition indicators. The main trend in growth confirms the relative 
similarity: from a confrontation with the other countries of the area, one can see that heavy and wide reforms 
have produced a faster turnaround in growth (there is a positive GDP rate of growth in 1994 only in these 
countries) and a smaller cumulative decline through 1989-94 with respect to the others [Sachs and Warner, 
1995]. Moreover, only these countries have been important FDI targets with significant inflows also in an 
international comparison [Hunya, 1997]. 
5 The first kind of motivations should capture the horizontal MNEs' activity replicating production in a market-
seeking strategy, while the second one should give account of the vertical MNEs' activity fragmenting 
production in an efficiency-seeking vision. 
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empirical analysis, namely: (i) operation risk index (ORI),6 (ii) political risk index (PRI),7 (iii) 
legal framework index,8 all of them provided by BERI (Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence); (iv) the credit rating index elaborated by the Institutional Investment9; (v) the 
World Bank institutional and legal quality indices10; (vi) the EBRD index for the degree of 
development of security markets and non-financial institutions11; (vii) the EBRD overall 
composite index12; (viii) EBRD’s transition scores; (ix) the Transparency International index 
of corruption perception: (x) the Euromoney index of market perception13; (xi) some indexes 
related to liberalisation and specific-capital-flows restriction elaborated by individual 
scholars14; (xii) indicators of privatisation process and methods, usually proxied by dummy 
variables.  
The empirical evidence is spread across a wide range of outcomes. However, the studies 
about the motivations of FDI provide some "regularities" despite differences in time spans, 
the sets of home- and host- countries considered, as well as the techniques they use.  First of 
all, the Market size and the potential demand - sometimes called "gravity factors" - are 
consolidated variables and they turn out extremely significant in Lansbury et al. [1996], 
Altomonte [2000], Holland et al.[2000], and Bevan and Estrin [2004].15  The institutional 
variables are predominantly significant. "Host-country transition progress, perceived political 
stability and low perceived risk levels are positively associated not only with the overall level 
of FDI inflow, but also with the character of the investment" [Lankes and Venables, 1996, p. 
346],  i.e. an investment  more firmly maintained, and more integrated with the general 
politics of the parent-firm. In fact, a composite variable for investment climate is extremely 
important in Deichman [2001]. The perception of risk and the state of economic liberalisation 
and of reforms are highly and positively significant  in Garibaldi et al. [2001]. The PRI and 
ORI variables are equally extremely significant in Singh and Jun [1996] and the ORI has a 
                                                 
6  Altomonte [2000] and  Resmini [2001];  Giner-Giner [2004] in a different geographical context.  
7  Singh and Jun [1996].  
8   Altomonte [2000]. 
9   Bevan and Estrin [2004]. 
10  Garibaldi et al., [2001].  
11  Garibaldi et al., [2001]. 
12  Deichmann [2001] 
13  Garibaldi et al., [2001]; Frenkel et al., [2004]. 
14 de Melo et al., [1996] calculated a liberalisation index which has been utilised by Kinoshita and  Campos, 
[2003], and by Garibaldi et al., [2001]. The latter - besides elaborating a more complex index on that basis - 
compute an index of restriction to capital flows.  
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strong effect in Altomonte [2000] and in Resmini [2001], where it has particular impact in 
scale intensive sectors. The risk index and the economic development index play a substantial 
role in Frenkel et al. [2004], the proxy for infrastructures and the indices for the external 
liberalisation are the most robust variables in Kinoshita and Campos [2003].   On the contrary, 
in Bevan and Estrin [2004] the "country risk" variable is not significant. However, this might 
be due to the peculiar characteristic of their variable i.e. the credit rating from Institutional 
Investor, which is an indicator based upon the opinion of international banks. It is quite 
plausible that institutional investors believe that the transition process is too big to fail even 
though it necessarily involves some costs, and that such worries do not affect the decision of 
whether to invest in a given area. As far as privatisation is concerned, Djankov and Murrell 
[2002] - which in our knowledge is the most exhaustive study on this topic - assert that the 
aggregate effects of privatisation on enterprise restructuring in Eastern Europe are positive 
and that different types of owners (i.e. different methods of privatisation) matter in so far as 
they have different effects on the business environment.  Also Kalotay and Hunya [2000] 
affirm that the methods matter, and Estrin et al.  [2004] find that mass-privatization has had a 
growth enhancing function.   
Secondly, evidence about other "traditional" variables  like distance or labour costs, ) is 
less robust. However, sometimes contradictory empirical results might be ascribed to the 
dynamic nature of the transition process, so that some of the factors that were at work in the 
early stages of transition are no longer effective as the process evolves, while new variables 
come into the picture. In this sense the distance variable provides an interesting example to 
the extent that it is not significant in Altomonte [2000], though it was significant in earlier 
Cieℑlik [1996]. Since distance is a proxy for customary relations, it is plausible to assume 
that at the outset of the transition process FDI was more likely to originate from closer 
countries - mainly Germany and Austria - and only during the more advanced stages of 
transition more far away partners - more "culturally distant" partners -  would have been 
attracted by these countries. This is the "proximity-matter" argument very often present in the 
literature on FDI.  Similarly, the proxies for endowments (i.e., some differences between 
labour costs in the home and host country) were not significant in earlier studies, while they 
                                                                                                                                                        
15  Bevan and Estrin [2004] shows also a significant  "announcement" effect related to the EU accession of some 
CEECs and yet indicative of future markets and demand. 
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were found to significantly affect FDI inflows  later on16. The interpretation could easily be 
that at the beginning of the process a first-mover market-seeking kind of opportunity was the 
best option,17 coming from those developed countries which were more able to disentangle 
what was going on in the transition countries. Moreover, at least at the beginning of the 
process the differences in the labour markets seem more important in choosing the location 
among the countries in transition rather than influencing the choice between the home- and 
the host-countries (Lansbury et al., 1996). For instance, the labour-cost differential is not 
significant in Cieℑlik [1996], while it is so in the more recent Altomonte [2000], in 
Deichmann [2001], in Holland et al. [2000], and in Bevan and Estrin [2004]. Again, no or 
limited role for the cost-variables is consistent with an earlier  typology of foreign investment  
where "horizontal" large MNEs mainly interested into the replication of both production and  
distribution are present. This structure evolves  through time  towards one  where also 
"vertical" MNEs are present, interested in some form of fragmentation of their production,  
and eventually  enlarges  to a group with a more conspicuous presence of smaller late comers 
SMEs, more sensible to costs. Resmini [2001] sectoral results, for instance, give evidence of 
such a pattern. Last, the role of incentives (fiscal, financial, and others) seems scarce: 
Lansbury et al., [1996], Economists Advisory Group [1998] and the more recent Sass [2003].  
In what concerns the effects of FDI,  evidence of their complementarity with trade is 
provided in Singh and Jun [1996], Hunya [1997], Brenton et al. [1999], Altzinger and Bellak 
(1999),  Kaminski [2001], Bevan and Estrin [2004], Bradshaw [2005], and Kaminski and Ng 
[2005]. Nevertheless, the view that FDI contributes to exports is rather simplistic and 
optimistic since FDI is  connected to both exports and imports, and it can eventually lead to 
trade deficit instead of surpluses.18 Therefore FDI seems to contribute to the relative openness 
of an economy in a more general sense.   
As far as the effects on growth are concerned, Barrell and Holland [2000] find that FDIs 
have contributed to the labour-augmenting technical progress in most manufacturing sectors 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, due to the intangibles introduced by foreign 
                                                 
16  Nevertheless, the "wage" variable is not significant even in a fairly recent paper such as Garibaldi et al., 
[2001]   
17  As it seems to be the evidence [Hunya, 1997; Lankes and Venables, 1996], given that the first wave of FDI 
was coming from large MNEs (based in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and the US) who were mainly 
looking for new local markets. Lankes and Venables [1996] recall that the function of the projects (serving 
the local market or being export-supply oriented) varies with the progress in transition.  
18   Hunya [1997] and  Kalotay and Hunya [2000]. 
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firms. Marin et al. [2002] find evidence of technology spillovers from the German firms to 
their affiliates in the CEECs, both because the former often belong to the high-technology 
sector and because they protect themselves choosing full ownership as the dominant entry-
mody. On the contrary, Uminski and Stepniak [2004] show for Poland that just a second-rank 
category of technical progress has been very often transferred.  Although the positive impact 
of FDI on the total factor productivity of recipient firms is confirmed also in Djankov and 
Hoekman [2000], the same authors find that greater foreign participation in an industry affects 
negatively and significantly the performance of other firms lacking any form of foreign 
partnership, as if the competition effect would dominate the technological one. This result is 
also confirmed by Holland et al. [2000] for the three countries, while Konings [2001] does not 
find any spillover to domestic firms in Poland. It seems that foreign ownership limits the 
options for future company strategies and for R&D activity [Hunya, 1997], and that some 
crowding out of domestic firms has taken place [WIR, 1999 and WID, 2003]. However, 
notwithstanding the fact that the acquired firms could be flattened to sub-units, and that the 
staff is often reduced, all the surveys of the 1990s indicate that the new organisational 
discipline and the innovative role of being part of the MNE network lead to an overall 
improvement in the industrial-relations world.19 However, the employment side is almost 
unaffected:  it has been proved recently that inward flows had some minimum effect on 
employment in the Czech Republic [Kippenberg 2005], and that on the average in the area it 
did not bring skills upgrading , it produced marked wage differentials between areas with and 
without FDI, and it did not democratised the industrial relations [Smith and Pavlinek, 2000]. 
Just in the Polish case some positive effects on employment are present [Altomonte and 
Resmini, 2002], even though the influence on the labour market of being privatised seem to 
be a short run outcome since it is concentrated within a range of 3-6 years after privatisation 
[Mickiewicz et al., 2005]. 
 
SECTION II: the empirical estimate 
II.1 The data 
In our paper we use different data sets, in order to have the most reliable data possible. It 
is worthy noticing, in fact, that there are still persistent problems in collecting data about 
                                                 
19   Kalotay and Hunya [2000]. 
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Central and Eastern European Countries, even in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland that are by far the most advanced countries. We did not use statistical publication 
of these countries because incomplete or not comparable between each other.  
At an aggregate level, we use the data provided by the World Investment Report, 
published by the UNCTAD.  The 2003 edition provides statistics about inwards and outwards 
FDI from 1998 to 2002, both in terms of flows (millions of dollars and as a percentage of 
gross fixed capital formation) and stock (millions of dollars and as a percentage of GDP). As 
we need data from the beginning of the transition period, we use as well older publication of 
the same World Investment Report. The 2001 edition provides FDI statistics back to 1995. 
At country level we use the data on the Transition Reports, published annually by the 
EBRD. The 2001 edition provides statistics on FDI inflows in transition countries from 1989 
to 2001 (projection), on the cumulative FDI inflows (general and per capita) in the period 
1989-2000, and FDI inflows per capita in the years 1999 and 2000. All these data are 
expressed in million of US$. Furthermore it provides data on FDI inflows as a percentage of 
GDP in the years 1999 and 2000.  
Data on the education level of the labour force come from The World Development CD-
Rom by the OECD, while the ones on IT access and infrastructures we have use the World 
Development Indicators by the World Bank.  
As for other institutional indexes Euromoney provides the indicator for political and 
economic risk. The Heritage Foundation developed an index of political freedom. 
Although not a part of our data, an important source of disaggregate data is provided by 
Altomonte, in Alessandrini (2000). The statistical annex shows several different data: the 
initial value and  the number (as a percentage too) of the investment initiatives of the EU-15 
countries, of the USA, Japan and South Korea in the transition countries (1987-1998, in 
million of Euro), also differentiating between economies of scale sector and traditional sector; 
the initial value and the number (as a percentage too) of the European investments by sector 
and host countries. However, data are not divided per years and therefore it was not possible 
to use. 
There is also some data we have not been able to use: for instance, Transparency 
International Corruption Index is not available for the whole period we are interested in. The 
same applies for Polity IV, as a measure of the quality of political institutions, and to the 
EBRD index for infrastructures.   
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II.2 The model 
In this section we outline how we develop our model and the variables we use to specify 
it.  
The aim of our research is to identify how institutional variables affect FDI inflow in the 
three countries we examine. Thus our explicatory variables are, mainly, as we shall examine 
below of institutional character. In particular, given the peculiar context of transition, an 
important role is played by the privatisation strategies. Therefore, we describe the FDIs 
inflows as follows: 
(1)   
( _1, , , , )FDI f GDP PRMeth LabSkills EconReforms Wage=                             
Our model, in short, describes the FDI inflows as a function of the size effect (represented 
by the Gross Domestic Producs lagged one year), of the various privatisation methods 
(PRMeth), by the skills of the labour force, (LabSkills), by an index (or more indexes, in fact) 
of economic (and political) reforms (EconReforms), and by the temporal dynamics of wages 
(Wage).  
 
Explanatonary variables 
We, then, use a number of variables to capture the institutional factors that influence 
FDI inflows.  
Privatisation has been a hotly debated argument in the debate over economic reforms in 
post-socialist economies. We distinguish three different privatisation methods: direct sale 
(DS), voucher privatisation (VS) and Management and Employees’ Buyouts (MEBOs), which 
of them is represented by a dummy variable in our model. The value we give to each 
dummies is 1 in the case the selected variable is the primary method of privatisation, 0,5 if it 
is the secondary method, 0 if is absent, following the data provided by the EBRD’s Transition 
Reports (see also Garibaldi et al. for the same methodology). It is not the aim of this paper to 
review the arguments and the instruments alike of the privatisation debate. It would be enough 
to remind that the countries we selected have chosen different privatisation paths and, thus, 
can offer us an appropriate synthesis on the impact of different methods for creating a 
favourable market environment. 
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In particular, the Czech privatisation privileged the so-called voucher privatisation, that 
basically consisted in distributing shares, in form of voucher, of the State property that was 
about to be sold to the whole population and then organising auctions to allow people to buy 
shares of the firms they were interested in. Private investment funds, although not included in 
the mass privatisation plan, were able to collect approximately two-thirds of the voucher 
points, thus acquiring important shares of SOEs. Ownership shifted to outside investors. VP 
has been a popular method of privatisation in transition countries and had the advantage of 
being fast and to redistribute equally the State ownership. Yet, it created a long agency chain 
and therefore problems of corporate governance20. The expected impact on FDI is mixed: an 
early privatisation is supposed to boost FDI, while the problems of corporate governance can 
trigger it.   
The Polish mass-privatisation programme, instead, was designed to create dominant 
owners for the enterprises to be privatised, in order to guarantee the appropriate incentives to 
restructure the firms and to speed up their ultimate and genuine transfer to the private sector. 
Mass privatisation in the industry sector was delayed: the programme, launched in 1994, four 
years after the liberalisation, tried to combine a broad public participation with a 
concentration of shares in the hands of large investors21. In the Polish case, there is also an 
interesting case of dynamic that our model captures: while for the years before 1994 MEBOs 
were the primary means of privatisation, VS took its place in the year of mass privatisation, 
while in the last years the dominant method to privatise was DS. The changing values of our 
dummies represent this evolution. 
The sale of SOEs has been the preferred path in Hungary. SOEs were converted into 
corporations the stocks of which were in the hands of the State Property Agency that selected 
and then prepared the firms were ready to be privatised22. Firms were also allowed to self-
privatise. DS is the easiest privatisation methods, but is slow and too much polticised, giving 
too much power to the bureaucrats, whilst raising less revenues for the State23. While this 
method is expect to have a strong effect on FDIat the beginning – and, in fact, Hungary has 
been the most successful country in attract foreign investment in the first years of transition – 
                                                 
20 Stiglitz [1999].  
21 Brada [1996]. 
22 Brada [1996]. 
23 Brada[1996], Bornstein[1999].  
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DS influence on FDI can be triggered in a second period, as best firms are already sold and 
last ones tend to attract less interest.  
As far as institution building is concerned, we have used an index of economic freedom 
developed by the Heritage Foundation and that includes important aspects of transition, as 
regulations, development of the banking sector and property rights enforcement. Rule of law 
is a focal point in the debate over the transition to market economy and its respect is 
considered to be a pillar of the success of transition strategies. Reduction of over-regulation 
alike is important to promote entrepreneurial sprit. The index captures the impact of 
institutions building in the development of an attractive environment for investors, and we use 
it also as a proxy of economic corruption, given the strong correlation found between over-
bureaucratisation, non respect of the rule of law and corruption itself. On the base of the 
world index, we have calculated the ranks of the three countries (Reconfree), expecting FDI’s 
inflow to increase as reforms are implemented and the rank becoming higher. 
The Country risk index by Euromoney is a proxy for investor’s perception of the 
countries’ situation: this should incorporate political risk as well as economic stability. Also 
in this case we have compiled a ranking, so to compare transition performances to the rest of 
the world. This scheme is intended to capture the progresses made by reforms as time goes 
by. In fact, these progresses should be higher than in the rest of the world, given the 
transitional nature of the economic and political systems. Progress in the rank (rankeuro) are 
expected to positively influence FDI’s inflows.  
We have also included an information technology access index to capture the impact of 
IT development in the last decade. In particular, in the case of Eastern Europe, where the use 
of telecommunications was discouraged by the State, the increase in the number of phones, 
computers and internet alike is an important signal of modernisation that increase the chances 
of linkages with foreign partners.   
Economic variables are as well part of our model. 
Gross domestic product (lrgdp_1), lagged one year, is meant to capture the size effect. 
The very fact of having selected those three countries that presented paths of regular and 
steady growth after the initial output collapse should allow us to concentrate on institutional 
factors avoiding output shocks generated both on the demand and supply side.  
Annual increase of wage level (lwage) adjusted for productivity and differential from the 
average of the rest of the other European Countries is one of our measures for 
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competitiveness. Results can be puzzling. Although the literature on FDI suggests an increase 
of investment directly related to the widening of the salary gap, this may not be the case in our 
three countries. FDIs can be not related to salary level when they are market seeking, as they 
were in some countries in Eastern Europe. Secondly, an increase of wages can also be a proxy 
of more economic stability and/or of restructure of the firms – a restructured firm squeeze the 
costs reducing the number of employees and increase productivity and therefore wages. The 
other two variables we used to test the model, labour cost (lab cost) and the differential 
between real wage increase in the G7 countries and our three countries (wdiff), suffer of the 
same problem.  
We use secondary education of the labour force to measure the skills of the workers 
(lskill).We have preferred this parameter to tertiary education insofar as FDIs are concentrated 
in the manufactory sector where educational level is supposed to be lower. Furthermore, in 
particular for what concerns higher education, there may be some puzzling aspects in 
transition: in fact, given the initial conditions of an extremely high percentage of well-
educated workers, the trend, as a consequence of the initial output fall and of the collapse of 
the public educational system, is likely to be negative, an oddly situation in the existing 
literature. Secondary education, instead, shows a more stable path.  
We did not take into account some other variables and we owe an explanation for this. 
Initial conditions, that have been such an important argument in the transition debate, are not 
represented because our data starts from 1993 and most of the differences between our three 
countries have been offset during the first four years of transition. In addition, being the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland the most three advanced economies in the area, they are 
the ones most easily comparable. Furthermore, fixing our initial year in 1993 is a useful tool 
to avoid the impact of the first years of transition. Shock therapy and gradual approach would 
have been played a too big role in our regression, offsetting the impact of the variables we are 
interested in. In 1993 GDP reduction and hyperinflation had already disappeared and both the 
three countries were slowly starting to resume economic growth. As long as economic 
stability was already achieved, we have decided not to analyse the impact of inflation and 
different exchange rate regimes, albeit some substantial differences among the countries.  
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In the first round of regressions we have used the following equation, testing it 
alternatively with the labour cost, the real wage and the real wage differentials as proxies for 
competitiveness. 
 
 (2a)   _1lrFDI lrGDP VP DS MEBOs reconfree lskill labcoα β γ δ η ϑ κ= + + + + + +   
 
(2b)   _1lrFDI lrGDP VP DS MEBOs reconfree lskill lwageα β γ δ η ϑ κ= + + + + + +  
 
(2c)   _1lrFDI lrGDP VP DS MEBOs reconfree lskill wdiffα β γ δ η ϑ κ= + + + + + +  
 
where lrFDI is the log of the FDI inflows, lrGDP_1 is the log of the GDP lagged one, 
VP is voucher privatisation, DS is direct sale, MEBO is Management and Employees Buyout 
(our third dummies that becomes the constant in the regression), reconfree is the position of 
our countries in the world-rank created using the index of economic freedom of the Heritage 
Foundation, lskill is the labour skills as described above and labco (2a) is the labour cost, 
lwage (2b) is the real wage corrected for the productivity and wdiff (2c) is the real wage 
differential between the G7 countries and the three selected countries. 
 
In the second round, using only the last two of the above equations we have added the 
rank of our three countries in the index elaborated each year by Euromoney (rankeuro).  
 
(3a)
_1lrFDI lrGDP VP DS MEBOs reconfree lskill lwage rankeuroα β γ δ η ϑ κ µ= + + + + + + +  
 
(3b) 
_1lrFDI lrGDP VP DS MEBOs reconfree lskill wdiff rankeuroα β γ δ η ϑ κ µ= + + + + + + +  
 
SECTION III: Results 
The results we find in all the five equations are in line with our expectations. In all the 
five regression the GDP is positive and significant, confirming all the existing results in the 
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literature. Voucher Privatisation and Direct Sale are both positive and extremely significant, 
reflecting the idea that extensive programmes of privatisation foster FDIs. MEBOs, instead, is 
negatively correlated with FDIs, although significant only in equations 2a and 3b. This is not 
surprising: management and employee’s buyout usually happened in very small firms, unable 
to attract the interest of foreign partners. Furthermore, insiders’ privatisation, as effectively 
MEBOs are, is usually the less efficient mean of privatisation and the less likely to foster 
restructuring. It is a common feature in the existing literature, in fact, that insiders, fearing to 
loose their jobs, are not willing to improve efficiency through restructuring. This, of course, 
represents a serious obstacle for FDIs.  
Labour skills are also positive and significant as well as the rank of economic freedom. 
Structural reforms, de-bureaucratisation and de-politicisation of the economic activity, 
creation of a functioning financial sectors are all circumstances that seem, as expected to 
attract foreign capital. The Euromoney score that includes political stability too is also 
positive, albeit less significant in the two regression (3a, 3b) where it is present.  
Finally, wage and labor cost. Real wage is constantly negative (as well as labor cost) in 
all the equations where is present. This is not surprising since an increase in real wage (or in 
the labour cost) is likely to discourage FDIs. Conversely, wage differential in the equation 2c 
and 3b is positive. Yet, in all five cases the parameter is not significant. As previously said, in 
fact, the wage effect in the transition-case is particularly puzzling. Market-seeking firms may 
not be particularly influenced by wage increase in their investment decisions (contrary to 
efficiency-seeking ones), but, above all, wage increase may also signal an implemented 
restructuring process in the firs, with efficiency gains and, via downsizing, less costs. Finally, 
wage dynamics is likely to be influenced by the Balassa-Samuelson effect.  
In conclusion, our analysis suggests that FDI inflows in mature transition economies is 
likely to be strongly influenced by institutional factors. Privatisation methods matters, as 
insiders’ privatisation discourages foreign investment, contrary to more extensive and 
efficient means of privatisation such as Direct Sale and Voucher Privatisation (in the Czech 
version, at least). Improvement in the economic environment, de-bureaucratisation and, 
eventually, demise of the old socialist structures, are, unsurprisingly, a positive factor as well. 
With this research we attempted to reduce the sample in order to work more efficiently on 
institutional factors, avoiding, thus, the problems related with the first phase of transition. The 
focus on these factors is a consequence of authors’ belief in the importance of institutions to 
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build the market. We hope that more extensive researches, with an enlarged number of 
countries already economic and political stable, and with more uniform data available, may 
complete this path.    
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APPENDIX 
Model 2a: 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =      30 
                                                       F(  6,    23) =   16.23 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6836 
                                                       Root MSE      =    .405 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lrfdi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lrgdp_1 |   .7771206   .1737968     4.47   0.000     .4175945    1.136647 
         vp1 |    2.71131   .6508065     4.17   0.000     1.365015    4.057606 
         ds1 |   2.892999   .7548603     3.83   0.001     1.331451    4.454546 
    recofree |   .0275136   .0094121     2.92   0.008     .0080433    .0469839 
      lskill |   .0425613   .0104485     4.07   0.000      .020947    .0641756 
     labcost |  -.0043787   .0050355    -0.87   0.394    -.0147954    .0060379 
       _cons |  -7.195217   3.440979    -2.09   0.048    -14.31342   -.0770103 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Model2b: 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =      30 
                                                       F(  6,    23) =   13.49 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6705 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .41331 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lrfdi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lrgdp_1 |   .5960234   .2124952     2.80   0.010     .1564437    1.035603 
         vp1 |   2.300951   .6045471     3.81   0.001      1.05035    3.551552 
         ds1 |   2.411017    .658859     3.66   0.001     1.048063    3.773971 
    recofree |   .0253583   .0098087     2.59   0.017     .0050675    .0456491 
      lskill |   .0415293   .0122318     3.40   0.002     .0162259    .0668326 
       lwage |   -.402267   1.227772    -0.33   0.746    -2.942107    2.137573 
       _cons |  -1.571155   9.068271    -0.17   0.864     -20.3303    17.18799 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 2c: 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =      30 
                                                       F(  6,    23) =   14.69 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6701 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .41352 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lrfdi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lrgdp_1 |   .6157773   .1767096     3.48   0.002     .2502257    .9813289 
         vp1 |   2.295687   .5881536     3.90   0.001     1.078998    3.512375 
         ds1 |   2.424329   .6476164     3.74   0.001     1.084632    3.764026 
    recofree |   .0253044   .0097909     2.58   0.017     .0050503    .0455585 
      lskill |   .0416659   .0121268     3.44   0.002     .0165797    .0667522 
       wdiff |   .0032364   .0114466     0.28   0.780    -.0204428    .0269155 
       _cons |  -3.816686   3.263664    -1.17   0.254    -10.56809    2.934716 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
Model 3a 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =      30 
                                                       F(  7,    22) =   20.99 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7202 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .38941 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lrfdi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lrgdp_1 |   .5800104   .2238207     2.59   0.017     .1158346    1.044186 
         vp1 |   3.139733    .782341     4.01   0.001     1.517258    4.762209 
         ds1 |   3.909753   1.030637     3.79   0.001     1.772343    6.047164 
    recofree |   .0203871   .0101643     2.01   0.057    -.0006923    .0414665 
    rankeuro |   .0353388   .0174417     2.03   0.055     -.000833    .0715107 
      lskill |   .0502576   .0144623     3.48   0.002     .0202646    .0802505 
       lwage |   -.534749   1.214817    -0.44   0.664    -3.054126    1.984628 
       _cons |  -4.380797   8.817316    -0.50   0.624    -22.66679     13.9052 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 3b 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =      30 
                                                       F(  7,    22) =   22.18 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7190 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .3902 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lrfdi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lrgdp_1 |   .6128206   .1824366     3.36   0.003     .2344702    .9911711 
         vp1 |   3.104722   .7557162     4.11   0.000     1.537462    4.671981 
         ds1 |   3.896538   1.020273     3.82   0.001     1.780622    6.012454 
    recofree |   .0203623   .0101301     2.01   0.057    -.0006464    .0413709 
    rankeuro |    .035006   .0171488     2.04   0.053    -.0005583    .0705704 
      lskill |   .0498433   .0142012     3.51   0.002     .0203919    .0792947 
       wdiff |    .003664   .0111453     0.33   0.745    -.0194499    .0267778 
       _cons |  -7.387813    3.42056    -2.16   0.042    -14.48162   -.2940049 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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